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  2. War of Causes and Definition | - HISTORY
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So how do we make sure everyone gets enough water — and thus keep relative world peace in the 21st Century? There are three main issues when it comes to water in the 21st Century, says Aaron Wolf. The first issue is the most obvious: water scarcity. The second issue is the political implications of that scarcity. For example, in Syria, that history-making drought drove more people to cities, saw rising food prices, and exacerbated tensions in the country that already existed.

The third main issue — and perhaps the most underreported, experts say — is that trans-boundary flow of water. In other words: water moving between countries. Population explosions, especially in Asia and Africa, strain resources.

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Increasing global temperatures have led to some bodies of water drying up. And rising nationalism worldwide may stymie diplomatic efforts across the board. For example, Afghanistan is an upstream country to many nations in the region, and is trying to use that advantage to develop its economy. But amid all these changes in the aqua political landscape, experts urge us to remember that not all water exists in rivers and lakes and even oceans. If you include virtual water in the picture, farmers are managing much of the water in the supply chain.

And in countries that are water deficient, that imported embedded water is integral. And by the time the food reaches the destination country, its politicians use subsidies to keep food prices low. The reason? For water-surplus countries like the United States or Canada, they sell these products to more water-deficient countries at a low price. In other words, countries depend on imported food — and the water needed to make it.

But in reality, the water that goes into the country's food is being brought in from elsewhere. Of course countries need low-priced food, especially in places with lower income citizens.

  • The New Face Of War by Berkowitz, Bruce D.
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  • But the public needs to know that imports, exports, and hydro-diplomacy are what really keep countries with imbalanced water sources in balance. In our globalised, 21st Century world, it's not just about where countries fall along the flow of a river. It's about working together to share Earth's most vital resource. It's been around for millennia, and it's not going anywhere.

    Furthermore, the Americans and the Europeans have assumed that when the ball is in the soft-power court, they are favored to win, but the fact may be just the opposite as recent events indicate. At the same time, Grigas has words of criticism for the countries at risk. They are not paying suficient attention to legitimate grievances of their compatriots regarding arms, drugs, human traficking, terrorism, organized crime, and collapsed economies. Russian criminal organizations, often with the complicity of indigenous maias, play a critical role in corrupting the economic and political systems of all former Soviet entities.

    They continue to exploit the transition period from communism to a free market where even otherwise patriotic cultural, economic, and political elites are vulnerable to kompromat because of dodgy practices on their part or maturing legal systems. In short, Russian bankers and business tycoons are so entangled with organized crime igures it is impractical to deal with them as separate entities.

    The same holds true of the oligarchs and their involvement with Russian security institutions. Clearly, more work must be done on this score, but that is the subject of another book. To put it differently, in the wake of the Ukraine crisis, how has NATO struck a balance between diverging geographical priorities and between its three self-assigned missions i.

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    And what should the future equilibrium look like? The irst one focuses on the major strategic issues facing NATO today. The opening chapter by John R. As underlined by Schuyler Foerster in the subsequent chapter, however, the continuing relevance of extended deterrence for NATO should not let us forget that such a strategy inevitably raises perennial credibility concerns and dilemmas. In turn, Andrew T.

    War of Causes and Definition | - HISTORY

    In the fourth chapter, Magnus Petersson examines to what extent the global and the regional ambitions of NATO are pushing the Alliance into incompatible directions. Expeditionary strategy and territorial defense are two approaches that complement one another, as both presuppose a certain degree of interoperability and offensive capabilities.

    In a similar vein, Sten Rynning shows several lessons learned by NATO in Afghanistan can be put to good use in future contingencies: the need to share the same politico-strategic vision among Allies, the necessity to adopt a comprehensive approach, and the requirement of close coordination with operational partners. The last chapter of this section, by Damon Coletta, delves into the opportunities for NATO-Russia technical cooperation, in particular on missile defense. Hindered in many ways since the Ukraine crisis, technical cooperation is nonetheless partially ongoing and it should be expanded in order to generate positive spill-over effects for the relationship between NATO and Russia.

    The inal group of contributions is more eclectic. If the Russian intervention in Ukraine has contradicted the principles of noninterference and of the respect of state sovereignty defended by China, the crisis has also brought Russia and China— driven by a common rivalry with the United States—to forge closer ties in the economic, military, and political realms.

    Finally, the conclusion of the book, by Stanley R. One may notice some overlap between contributions, although this may be unavoidable in an edited volume.

    The New Face of War: How War Will Be Fought in the 21st Century

    Individually, the chapters do not provide a direct answer to the overall theme of the book, but by reading the chapters successively, the reader may sketch an overarching conclusion. From different diagnostics follow distinct remedies. Some readers may regret no speciic chapter has been devoted to the very issue on which the book ends, namely the relationship between NATO and the European Union.

    In any case, these are minor reservations. The book should be of great value and interest for practitioners and students of transatlantic relations. Del Monte Reviewed by Robert J. Del Monte, has a corporate background in microelectronics, sensors, and integrated circuits at the micro- and nano-technology levels.

    He has also written earlier books on artiicial intelligence and time travel theoretical to which this book Lincoln, NE: Potomac, on the subject of nanoweaponry is, in many ways, a natural progression. The page work is divided into acknowledgements, an intro- duction, three thematic parts The First Generation of Nanoweapons, The Game Changers, and The Tipping Point spanning 12 chapters, an epilogue, three appendices, notes, glossary, and an index. In addition, active American leader , Chinese a near follower , and Russian a distant third nanoweaponry programs exist at the classiied level While the majority of information pertaining to these programs is shrouded in secrecy, Del Monte has been able to synthesize enough disparate open source intelligence together to create basic outlines of US military service initiatives as well as those belonging to a number of other nations—both potentially belligerent as well as allied 45—75, — For example, nanoparticles added to explosives or even nukes are able to enhance their eficiency and destructive yield and, in some instances, even allow for their miniaturization 11, 47— It is not this component of the work, however, which is its real importance.

    Rather, it is the potential longer-term technological trends some decades away where the strategic implications of this advanced weaponry form become signiicant. These are derived from the projected emergence of advanced computers with artiicial intelligence, such as singularity computers, that will, at some point, exceed the combined intellect of humanity coupled with the development of self-replicating smart nanobots — This form of weaponry offers a new set of horrors that can be inlicted upon humanity.

    That said, a basic criticism of Nanoweapons is that essentially no literature review was conducted related to the small number of earlier works on the technology predating this effort. While K. For instance, no mention is made of Daniel and Mark A. Another criticism is that Del Monte—by his own admission—is a technologist and not well versed in policy, or for that matter, international affairs So when he makes military and arms control suggestions or envisions the international system of , he is not always authoritative in his arguments. Even with these inherent criticisms, given the glaring dearth of unclassiied works on nanoweaponry, the book ills an important and critical gap in an emerging and little-understood area of twenty-irst century military science.

    The area is one that the author, accurately proposes will result in the rise of powerful nanoweaponry-armed states and, potentially, even corporations , and where a misstep with this cutting edge technology could someday potentially result in an extinction-level event equivalent to that of a strategic nuclear exchange taking place between the Russia and the United States.

    The work has been written as a historiography of future-war thinking and projections—not as a projection of future around mid-twenty-irst century warfare itself. The book is divided into three parts: the Franco-Prussian War of —71 through the end of the Cold War , s through contemporary issues, and developing and future concerns. These three historical sequences are dominated by multi- and then bi-polarity such as great powers and superpowers ; unipolarity the United States as the last remaining superpower , state- fragility, and the rise of violent nonstate actors; and resurgent multi- or bi-polarity along with the concurrent emergence of high-tech weaponry.

    The book is well referenced, has an extensive bibliograpy, and an index for keyword and name searches. The approach utilized in The Future of War: A History is one that: locates the writing on future war in the concerns of the time. The aim is not just to assess how prescient different writers were, or whether they could have done better given what was known about new weaponry or the experi- ence of recent wars, but to explore the prevailing understandings about the causes of war and their likely conduct and course. How people imagined the wars of the future affected the conduct and course of those wars when they inally arrived.

    Unanticipated wars, in forms that had not been imagined, left participants and commentators struggling to understand where they had come from and how they might best be fought xix. It should, without reservation, be considered a welcome addition to both the personal library of the more seasoned scholar as well as that of the senior level oficer. He argues social media has helped to dismantle traditional information and media hierarchies.

    That point has pages been well made elsewhere. Her credibility lay in her status as an eyewitness. Photographs and vivid language brought home the emotion and horror of a little girl trying to survive battleield violence. She used Twitter to highlight the most extreme effects of war, garner sympathy, and build public support for Gaza by showing the extent of the carnage that the Israel Defense Forces IDF was wreaking.

    Using media to tell a story that detailed what she was living through, Farah deined a powerful message: war caused children to suffer. She showed that controlling the narrative mattered as much or more than kinetic warfare. Imaginative and brilliant Israelis such as Lerner and Rubenstein proved resourceful. Israelis had to show they were not targeting civilians. They responded rapidly, using YouTube to generate powerful visuals to get out their narratives. Sending out clear and compelling content caused legacy media—broadcast networks—to pick it up.

    Israel thus refocused the perspective through which actions should be judged. Their technique started sentences with verbs and created titles and subtitles for the illustrations of the battleield violence, which bolstered credibility. In Ukraine, Anna Sandalova proved the power of Facebook in assembling a volunteer network that supplied Ukrainian soldiers ighting Russian-backed separatists.

    Notable is the account of how Elliot Higgins proved that crowdsourcing intelligence can beat government bureaucracy. He and a volunteer team proved that Russian-armed separatists shot down Flight MH That topic has been better covered elsewhere. Neither entity has proven successful. Bottom line.

    This book is deinitely worth a read. The author is a ine journalist. Jones Reviewed by Raymond A. Jones examines the operations of Jedburgh teams in support of the Allied campaign for France in Altogether, 93 Jedburgh teams deployed to France, organized tens of thousands of guerrillas, and coordinated the delivery of hundreds of thousands of weapons and munitions. Jones expands on the history of the Jedburghs by tying together the planning and implementation of their mission, the involvement of other Allied special forces—often at cross purposes—with the Maquis, and the reasons for successes and failures among the various Jedburgh teams.

    As more Jedburgh teams parachuted into the French interior during June and July, , the Allied invasion of southern France early August prompted a change in mission—preventing German forces in southwestern France from withdrawing to the east. The results were mixed: German armored and mechanized divisions managed to avoid capture; however, the Maquis forced the surrender of one German infantry division.

    Ultimately, the failure to ensnare substantial numbers of German troops permitted a defensive line to be established in eastern France. One important lesson from the latter stages of ighting in France is that the Jedburghs and the Maquis were more effective when rear areas existed, but less so once German divisions began streaming eastwards. The Jedburghs faced numerous challenges.

    This political tension inhibited cooperation, and these groups refused to cooperate with one another due to these differences. Paradoxically, the communist resistance groups were better organized, motivated, and fought more effectively, a fact the Jedburghs quickly recognized and supported. Successful supply drops required good weather, appropriate moon phases, and secure drop zones, which rarely aligned. Communications between the Jedburgh teams and SFHQ to coordinate the airdrops was also problematic when communications sergeants were injured or the radios were destroyed.

    Finally, Eisenhower wanted to limit the number of armed Maquis less than , to prevent their activities from spiraling out of control. For Eisenhower, the Jedburghs served a higher purpose than disrupting German operations, a revelation that Jones explains in detail. President Franklin D. In this manner, de Gaulle enjoyed the political support of the French people and was able to assume control of government. Fortunately, Jones provides two appendices on the French resistance leaders and the Jedburgh teams, outlining names, assigned regions, and deployment dates.

    The maps depicting Jedburgh locations and activities are also essential for reader understanding. Jones emphasizes that Jedburgh-like teams are quite effective in occupied enemy territories but fail dismally in enemy countries with domestic resistance groups. He concludes such resistance groups lack the requisite passion, organization, and wherewithal to overthrow the government of a police state.

    The general thrust of their argument is that the role of blood sacriice and dark magic symbols, is understudied, under-recognized and under- appreciated in the modern study of violent nonstate actors VNSA. In addition to the preface and introductory chapter, the book consists of ive topical essays, one review essay, four book reviews, and a postscript.

    Her argument is that a refusal to acknowledge some of these VNSAs engage in dark magic violence has led scholars to ignore an important motivation and factor in these violent acts. This volume has already received signiicant attention on Borderland Beat, a popular webpage covering border security issues, and was reviewed by Patrick Corcoran for Insight Crime, another popular and respected website covering organized crime in the Americas.

    Further, authors such as Rexton Kan acknowledge how the rational choice and economic understandings of VNSAs are not mutually exclusive with dark magico-religious practices. In his chapter on drug use by organized criminals, guerrillas, and terrorists, Kan describes how VNSAs incorporate drug use to enable gruesome killings that build a reputation.

    Rexton Kan acknowledges the instrumental use of extreme violence by terror groups and cartels to strike fear in the population and rivals. A careful reading of Bunker makes clear he does not reject rational choice explanations but sees deeper underlying phenomena at play in an evolutionary or devolutionary process. This point could have been pushed further to meld the rational choice theories with emic anthropological perspectives on the use of dark magic violence by VSNAs.

    Lisa J. She provides useful insights such as Islamic State continued drug use, which is non-Islamic, pushing it in the direction of a criminal network rather than a political insurgency. As Corcoran argues in his review of Blood Sacriices, there is no systematic research telling us exactly how widespread these phenomena are, such as what percentage of criminal or insurgent organization members engage in this activity.

    This level of aggregate data is vexingly hard to obtain and, even if it were luid, criminal networks and insurgen- cies are dynamic. As the various authors persuasively note, however, the practices are evolving and even when limited, have a wider symbolic impact upon the VSNAs and are thus worthy of study and attention. The interests of patron and client align on defeating insurgency, but often little more. This is particularly a problem for the host nation if it is focused on the short-term need to defeat the insurgency quickly, Ladwig argues Repression may quickly defeat a challenge but increase violence longer term.

    The important related point Ladwig also underlines is that the patron has relatively little leverage over the client because it has already identiied client survival as an important security interest. Ladwig focuses on how the patron can increase the likelihood of implementing reforms to professionalize the counterinsurgent military and increase political participation or otherwise reduce the grievances driving the insurgency.

    The lavish provision of aid, he argues, is unlikely to produce the desired changes in counterinsurgent government behavior. He bases his argument on analysis of three US interventions, in the Philippines against the Huk from —53, in South Vietnam from —63, and in El Salvador from — Ladwig identiies speciic US demands for reform and its behavior toward the client conditionality or inducement, sticks or carrots , and then evaluates whether the counterinsurgent government complied with US demands or not, and if so, to what degree.

    His policy recommendations are sensible: 1. Expect tense relations with the client. Do not fear coercing allies in crisis. Make conditions clear, measurable, and realistic. Prepare for internal opposition. Cultivate ties with local reformers. One surprising gap is the limited reference to the work of Douglas J. But Macdonald, like Ladwig, inds that a tit-for-tat relationship with the client is most effective in attaining reforms. Macdonald, like Ladwig, also inds unconditional commitments to the client mean less success in coercing the client to implement reforms.

    As with any scholarly work, there are limitations to the indings in The Forgotten Front. Ladwig considers only grievance-based insurgencies with signiicant popular support and those in which insurgents rely on the populace for their existence. In addition, the study examines only cases of US intervention during the Cold War. These scope conditions properly raise questions about to what degree these indings may apply to cases beyond the three studied. It is also not clear how the author identiies and measures leverage and degrees of policy implementation.

    The author also does not consider the relative cost to the client of different reforms and different types of reforms. Ladwig notes that military aid is of particular interest to the counterinsurgent government but might have drawn this thread throughout his analysis A government is more likely to make policy changes that cost it relatively less than other demanded changes, and it is more likely to make policy changes that gain it more desirable beneits.

    Thus client compliance is more likely on less costly reforms and on military reforms. No one book can answer all questions, of course. The Forgotten Front raises important questions for further study. The most pressing questions involve client interests and behavior, including the relative likelihood of client implementation of different types of reforms. Other questions raised here likely to lead to further fruitful analysis include the degree to which reforms are necessary for insurgent defeat, and to what degree, if at all, symbolic reforms help defeat an insurgency Smith Reviewed by Robert J.

    On a positive note, the work also has the endorsement of a number of well-respected gang researchers with considerable ield time under their duty belts. Chapters ive and six highlight gang activity in the military and civilian communities, respectively, and the criminality—including numerous homicides—that such members have engaged in. The fact that gang members are increasingly using military-like tactics on the streets of the United States is made clear to the reader.

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    Unsurprisingly, given such concerns, the book conceptually draws upon the third generation gangs 3 GEN Gangs model of which John P. Sullivan and the reviewer are proponents 21— This model, developed in the later s, discusses the evolution of street gangs through turf 1st , drug 2nd , and mercenary 3rd generations of sophistication and how the more evolved 3 GEN Gangs—Mara Salvatrucha MS and Los Zetas type entities—are becoming a signiicant threat to domestic security despite being a minority representation of gangs. This model is in variance with more traditional criminological- and sociological-based gang models, which focus on delinquency and deviance and are devoid of any form of gang-derived national security threat potentials.

    The reviewer found the work to be very well written and engaging, with the overview on early gangs, from the seventeenth through the mid-twentieth centuries, and their connections to the US military quite fascinating from a historical perspective. Critiques of the book are relatively minor and focus on three primarily style and layout issues. First, the work could beneit from a selected references section. Paging through over 30 pages of notes to determine which works have been consulted in the book can be rather tedious.

    All of these shortcomings could easily be addressed in a second edition of the work. I see great value in the work for military readers as it candidly chronicles an internal personnel issue—and metastasizing homeland security issue—typically shunned by the services due to bad publicity. In closing, Gangs and the Military—due to widening recognition of this concern—should be of increasing interest to US military oficers and national security scholars well into the future. These recommendations focus on providing commanders tools and options to mitigate the emergence, existence, and effects of military-trained gang members in their units as well as advocating a points system for agencies to determine the gang involvement of military personnel.

    Book Reviews: Utility of War As Nadia Schadlow argues persuasively in War and the Art of Governance only the military has the authority and resources to accomplish that dificult task in the wake of war. She attributes this syndrome to four main causes: democratic discomfort with the military leading political activities, a traditional American aversion to any taint of colonialism, a belief that civilians should always handle governance, and a narrow military view of its proper professional role in war reinforced by interpretations of Carl von Clausewitz and Samuel P.

    In many ways the exercise of military governance there and in the conquered territories marked a sort of highpoint for the practice, as the American record over the rest of next century was usually much worse. It was only with the establishment in of a separate Civil Affairs Division on the General Staff and the School for Military Government at Charlottesville that the whole issue of military governance began to gather signiicant interest and adherents further motivated by the problems General Eisenhower was confronting in North Africa.

    Extended occupations in Italy, Germany, and Japan produced models of what enlightened and empowered military governance could accomplish. More limited and less well-prepared efforts in Korea were not as successful. After examining Cold War postconlict reconstructions of Korea, the Dominican Republic, and Panama, she moves on to the rather dismal record in Afghanistan and Iraq, demonstrating how the denial syndrome undermined any chance for strategic success in both theaters of operation from the very beginning.

    And again, we have failed to learn from that experience. This very important book should be read by soldiers and policymakers, although the message may not be one they want to hear. As General Buck Turgidson proclaimed in Dr. The editors—Leo J. Blanken, Hy Rothstein, and Jason Lepore—address a previously ignored and esoteric aspect of Georgetown University Press, national defense, military assessment, in a comprehensible manner.

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    General George W. Casey Jr US Army Retired , the irst commander of Multi-National Force Iraq, provides the foreword, stating the importance of an assessment process that anticipates challenges and identiies opportunities as well as justiies changes. The authors include leading experts and veterans of the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This book seeks to generate recommendations and models for future strategic assessments and to document historical accounts of this neglected aspect of military history.

    The editors seek to provide a multidimensional look at military assessments in theory and in practice through historic and contemporary case studies as well as through alternative dimensions. The inal chapter of this section discusses the three primary problems with assessments: information overload, decision making without suficient information, and uncertainty. As with any anthology, the case studies proved somewhat uneven in both subjects and sources.

    Several of the case studies, such as those on the Civil War and the Indian Wars, cover only singular aspects of these long and complicated conlicts. The chapters covering the two world wars only provide analysis of selected aspects of strategic assessment. The last chapter on Vietnam, and the third section, focus on more current case studies during limited wars and counterinsurgencies.

    The last section addresses alternative dimensions of assessing war. These include a discussion of the Just War concept of proportionality; the challenge of assessment in cyberspace; the signiicance of assessing the war of ideas, or the battle of the narrative, and immature assessments of expensive economic development efforts.

    Finally, the proliic author on modern war Anthony Cordesman and Rothstein conclude the United States must set meaningful strategic goals with appropriate public narratives that can be assessed by suitable military assessment organizations using realistic metrics.


    Assessing War is a valuable book for serious students of strategy and military policy and is a must for readers interested in assessing military success. Expanded case studies that further investigate this important, but often overlooked, aspect of military strategy and planning—assessing how we are doing—are still needed. Unfortunately, most strategic thinkers do not spend suficient pages time mastering the details of the annual defense-budget process. The American political system was never designed to be eficient.

    Instead, it emphasizes checks and balances and popular control. Therefore, even though the women and men of the Department of Defense spend at least eighteen months carefully developing the annual defense budget for the armed services and defense agencies, the entire Congress, individual committees, or even individual members or their staffers can and do make numerous changes to speciic programs in the proposed budget.

    Moreover Congress is not only becoming increasingly involved in the details, it is taking longer and longer each year to pass a defense budget even in a time of war.